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THE NEW SENTENCING LAW 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
Ohio's new sentencing law raises a number of 
important constitutional and statutory issues. 
Several of these issues are examined briefly in this 
article. See generally Note, S.B.199: Ohio Adopts a 
Mandatory Sentencing Measure, 8 U. Dayton L. 
Rev. 425 (1983). 
An initial problem with the new law is its com-
plexity and use of confusing terminology. For ex-
ample, there are two types of "actual incarcera-
tion" in the new law. Aggravated-felony actual in-
carceration may be diminshed by good time; fire-
arms-offender actual incarceration may not be 
reduced by good time. RC 2929.01(C) & 
2929.71(D)(2). There is now a general classification 
of offenses known as "aggravated felonies," which 
must be distinguished from specific crimes such 
as aggravated murder and aggravated burglary. 
Prior to the new law, Ohio had six classifications 
for felonies: aggravated murder, murder, and 
felonies of the first, second, third, and fourth 
degree. With the addition of the new classifica-
tions of aggravated felonies of the first, second, 
and third degree, there are now nine classifica-
tions. 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
One of the principal effects of the new law will 
be the imposition of increased criminal sentences. 
The new categories of "aggravated felonies" in-
volve enhanced punishments for offenses falling 
within these categories. In addition, the firearms 
provision, RC 2929.71, automatically adds three 
years to the term of confinement and each fire-
arms-related offense triggers a new three-year con-
secutive prison term. 
These increased penalties raise the issue of 
whether, in a particular case, the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment may be violated. U.S. Canst. amend. 
VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-
ishments inflicted."). As one commentator has 
noted, the "prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment would ... appear to bar punishment 
authorized by statute which is excessive, that is, 
out of all proportion to the offense 
committed .... " W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal 
Law 164 (1972). Several Supreme Court decisions 
contain statements supporting this view. See 
Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("[l]t is a 
precept of justice that punishment for crime be 
graduated and proportioned to offense."); ln-
i' graham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) ("Cruel 
W and Unusual Punishment Clause ... proscr1bes 
punishment grossly disportionate to the severity of 
the crime .... ");Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 
(1958). 
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Rummel v. Estelle 
The Supreme Court's latest decisions on this 
issue, however, make it unlikely that the applica-
tion of the new statute will be successfully 
challenged on this ground. In Rummel v. Estelle, 
445 U.S. 263 (1980), the defendant challenged a 
mandatory life sentence, imposed pursuant to a 
Texas recidivist statute, as a violation of the cruel 
and unusual punishment clause. Rummel was con-
victed of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. He 
had been convicted of two prior felonies. The first 
conviction was for the fraudulent use of a credit 
card in which he had obtained $80 worth of goods 
and services; the second conviction was for pass-
ing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Rum-
mel argued that the imposition of a mandatory life 
sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the 
three felonies that formed the predicate for his 
sentence." /d. at 265. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that "[o]ut-
side the context of capital punishment, successful 
challenges to the proportionality of particular 
sentences have been exceedingly rare." /d. at 272. 
The one noncapital case in which the argument 
was successful, Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910), 
involved an unusual form of punishment known as 
cadena temporal, which required imprisonment 
with "a chain at the ankle and wrist of the of-
fender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from 
friend or relative, nor marital authority or parental 
rights or rights of property, no participation even in 
family council." /d. at 366. The fact that Rummel's 
crimes were nonviolent and involved small 
amounts of money were of no consequence. The 
Court's "hands off" policy in Rummel places a 
heavy burden on a defendant claiming a dispropor-
tionate sentence in a noncapital case. See general-
ly Note, Terrebonne v. Blackburn: The Propor-
tionality Principle in the Fifth Circuit After Rummel 
V. Estelle, 33 Mercer L. Rev. 1365 (1982). 
Hutto v. Davis 
The Court next considered the proportionality 
issue in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982). Davis 
was convicted in a state court of possession with 
intent to distribute and distribution of marihuana, 
for which a jury imposed a $10,000 fine and two 
consecutive 20-year prison terms. He argued that a 
forty-year sentence was so grossly disproportion-
ate to the crime of possessing less than nine 
ounces of marihuana that it constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment. A federal district court 
agreed and granted the defendant habeas relief, a 
decision that was upheld by the Fourth Circuit sit-
ting en bane. 
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court sum-
marily reversed. According to the Court, "Rummel 
stands for the proposition that federal courts 
should be 'reluctant to review legislatively man-
dated terms of imprisonment,' ... and that 'suc-
cessful challenges to the proportionality of par-
ticular sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare' ... " 
/d. at 460, quoting Rummel v. Estelle. In a footnote 
the Court provided an example of the "rare" case 
in which the proportionality argument might be 
successful: "We noted in Rummel that there could 
be situations in which the proportionality principle 
would come into play, such as "if a legislature 
made overtime parking a felony punishable by life 
imprisonment." /d. at 374 n. 3. 
The Court is presently considering another case 
in which the proportionality argument has been 
raised. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982), 
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982). In Helms the 
Eighth Circuit held that the imposition of a life 
sentence without parole for a habitual offender 
violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 
The court distinguished Rummel on two grounds. 
First, Rummel's life sentence did not preclude the 
possibility of parole. Second, Helms was an alco-
holic, a factor that contributed to his present and 
prior convictions. The Supreme Court heard argu-
ments on March 29, 1983. See 33 Grim. L. Rptr. 
4003 (1983). 
Ohio Cases 
The Ohio Constitution also contains a cruel and 
unusual punishment clause. Ohio Canst. art. I, § 9. 
The Ohio courts, however, have followed the ap-
proach of the U.S. Supreme Court and rejected pro-
portionality attacks on sentences. 
In McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St. 2d 68, 203 
N.E.2d 334 (1964), the court recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits "puni9hments which 
are so disproportionate to the offense as to shock 
the moral sense of the community." /d. at 69, 203 
N.E.2d at 336. In applying this standard in State v. 
Chaffin, 30 Ohio St. 2d 13, 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), the 
court held "that the 20-to 40-year sentence impos-
ed [for the sale of marijuana] does not constitute 
cruel or unusual punishment." /d. at 17, 282, 
N.E.2d 49. Significantly, the defendant in Chaffin 
based his challenge on state as well as federal 
constitutional grounds. See also State v. Juliano, 
24 Ohio St. 117, 120, 265 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1970) 
("[l]f a sentence falls within the terms of a valid 
statute, it will not amount to a 'cruel and unusual 
punishment.' ");State v. Wilkinson, 17 Ohio St. 2d 
9, 244 N.E.2d 480, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969); 
State v. Abercrombie, 40 Ohio App. 2d 89, 318 
N. E.2d 179 (1973). 
In State v. Bonello, 3 Ohio App. 3d 365, 445, 
N.E.2d 667 (1981), the defendant argued that the 
imposition of a mandatory sentence of actual in-
carceration imposed pursuant to RC 2925.03 for 
the sale of LSD was a cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Rejecting this argument, the court com-
mented: "Long terms of imprisonment in drug of-
fense cases have been upheld for much less ag-
gravated offenses than in the instant case." /d. at 
366, 445 N.E.2d at 670. The court also rejected the 
defendant's equal protection claim. According to 
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the court, the "legislature has inherent power to 
create classifications if such classifications are 1 
reasonable and some legitimate state interest is 
advanced." /d. at 366, 445 N.E.2d at 669. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
The new sentencing law provides that a person 
who either uses a firearm or has a firearm on or 
about his person or under his control at the time 
of the commission of an offense will serve three 
years of incarceration in addition to the sentence 
for the substantive offense for which he is con-
victed. RC 2929.71. Under this provision, it could 
be argued that the defendant is being subjected t 
double punishment in violation of the double 
jeopardy clause. U.S. Canst. amend. V ("[N]or sha 
any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). See general 
/y C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure ch. 24 (1980) 
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), th 
Supreme Court stated that the double jeopardy 
clause "protects against multipl'e punishments to 
the same offense." /d. at 717. See also U.S. v. 
Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-308 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169, 173 (1873) ("[T]he Con-
stitution was designed as much to prevent the 
criminal from being twice punished for the same 
offence as from being twice tried for it."). 
Missouri v. Hunter 
The Supreme Court recently addressed the issu 
of multiple punishments in Missouri v. Hunter, 10: 
S. Ct. 673 (1983). Based on participation in a rob-
bery of an A & P store in which he used a weapor 
Hunter was convicted of first degree robbery and 
armed criminal action. Under Missouri law, armed 
criminal action is defined as follows: 
[A]ny person who commits any felony under the laws 
of this state by, with, or through the use, assistance, 
or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon is also guilt) 
of the crime of armed criminal action and, upon con-
viction, shall be punished by imprisonment by the dh 
sion of corrections for a term of not less than three 
years. The punishment imposed pursuant to this sub 
section shall be in addition to any punishment provic 
ed by law for the crime committed by, with, or throu~ 
the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly 
weapon. No person under this subsection shall be 
eligible for parole, probation, conditional release or 
suspended imposition or execution of sentence for a 
period of three calendar years. /d. at 676. 
Hunter was sentenced to concurrent terms of 1 
years for first degree robbery and 15 years for am 
ed criminal action. The Missouri Supreme Court 
held that armed criminal action and the underlyin 
felony were "the same offense'~ for purposes of 
the double jeopardy clause and therefore the im-
position of punishment for both offenses was pro 
hibited. On review, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed. 
According to the Court, "[w]ith respect to 
cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, th 
Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than pre-
\ ('f. 
i I 1~{, 
vent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended." /d. at 
678. In a subsequent passage, the Court wrote that 
"simply because two criminal statutes may be 
construed to proscribe the same conduct ... does 
not mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause pre-
cludes the imposition, in a single trial, of cumula-
tive punishments pursuant to those statutes." /d. 
at 679. Since the Missouri Supreme Court had 
found that the legislature specifically intended to 
impose cumulative punishments, Hunter had suf-
fered no constitutional deprivation. To remove any 
remaining doubt, the Court added: "Legislatures, 
not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments." 
/d. 
Ohio Cases 
The Ohio Supreme Court has also addressed 
this issue. In State v. Moss, 69 Ohio St. 2d 515, 433 
N.E.2d 181 (1982), the defendant challenged the im-
position of consecutive sentences for aggravated 
murder and aggravated burglary on the ground that 
his sentence violated both the federal and state 
double jeopardy clauses. See Ohio Canst. art. I, § 
10 ("No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense."). In rejecting this argument, the 
court wrote: "In determining the constitutionality 
of the trial court's imposition in a single criminal 
proceeding of consecutive sentences, appellate 
review is limited to ensuring that the trial court did 
not exceed the sentencing authority which the 
General Assembly granted it." /d. (syllabus 1). See 
1 1~ a/so State v. Royster, 3 Ohio App. 3d 442, 446 
N.E.2d 190 (1982). 
RELEASE ON APPEAL 
Amended RC 2949.02 prohibits a trial court from 
releasing a defendant on his own recognizance if 
convicted of aggravated murder, murder, or an ag-
gravated felony. This amendment conflicts with 
Criminal Rule 46(E), which governs release after 
conviction. Rule 46 does not prohibit release on 
recognizance after conviction in cases involving 
these offenses. 
This conflict raises a state constitutional issue. 
Article IV, section 5(8) of the Ohio Constitution 
provides: "The supreme court shall prescribe rules 
governing practice and procedure in all courts of 
the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify any substantive right. ... All laws in con-
flict with such rules shall be of no further force or 
effect after such rules have taken effect." Under 
this constitutional provision, procedural rules pro-
mulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court control over 
conflicting statutory provisions. See Milligan & 
Pohlman, The 1968Modern Courts Amendment to 
the Ohio Constitution, 29 Ohio St. L.J. 811, 829 
(1968) ("There should now be no doubt that the 
authority of the Supreme Court in the rule-making 
area is plenary. Court action in this area super-
sedes contradictory legislation."); Note, Substance 
and Procedure: The Scope of Judicial Rule Making 
Authority in Ohio, 37 Ohio St. L.J. 364, 382 (1976) 
("[R]esponsibility for judicial procedure is placed, 
7 
by the Ohio Constitution, with the Ohio Supreme 
Court .... "). 
The issue is whether the right to release after 
conviction is a procedural right, in which case the 
rule controls, or a substantive right, in which case 
the statute controls. In interpreting section 5(8), 
the Supreme Court has written: " 'Substantive' 
means the body of law which creates, defines and 
regulates the rights of the parties." Krause v. 
State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 145, 285 N.E.2d 736, 744 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972). This definition is 
not particularly helpful and the resolution of this 
conflict will probably have to await Supreme Court 
review. See also State v. Slatter, 66 Ohio St. 2d 
452, 423, N.E.2d 100 (1981); State v. Waller, 47 Ohio 
St. 2d 52, 351 N.E.2d 195 (1976). See generally 
Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: 
The General Assembly, Evidence, and Ru/emaking, 
29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 16, 33-59 (1978). 
CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPT 
RC 2923.01(J) contains the penalty section for 
conspiracy. Subdivision (1) of that provision re-
mains unchanged; a person is guilty of a felony of 
the first degree "when one of the objects of the 
conspiracy is aggravated murder or murder." Sub-
division (2) has been amended. It now provides 
that a person is guilty of a "felony of the next 
lesser degree than the most serious offense that is 
the object of the conspiracy, when the most seri-
ous offense that is the object of the conspiracy is 
an aggravated felony of the first, second, or third 
degree, or a felony of the first second, or third 
degree." The issue is whether conspiracy to com-
mit an aggravated felony of the first degree is an 
aggravated felony of the second degree or a felony 
of the first degree. 
A similar issue arises with respect to attempts. 
RC 2923.02(E) provides: "An attempt to commit ag-
gravated murder or murder is a felony of the first 
degree. An attempt to commit any other offense is 
an offense of the next lesser degree than the of-
fense attempted." The penalty provision, RC 
2929.11, lists offenses in the following order: ag-
gravated felony of the first degree, felony of the 
first degree, aggravated felony of the second 
degree, felony of the second degree, and so forth. 
It seems doubtful, however, that the issue can be 
resolved merely by reference to this provision. 
The controlling statute should be RC 2901.04(A), 
which provides: "Sections of the Revised Code 
defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly con-
strued against the state, and liberally construed in 
favor of the accused." This statement is a codifi-
cation of the rule long recognized in Ohio as well 
as in other jurisdictions. See Harrison v. State, 112 
Ohio St. 429, 147 N.E. 650 (1925), aff'd, 270 U.S. 632 
(1926); State ex rei. Moore Oil Co. V. Dauben, 99 
Ohio St. 406, 124 N.E. 232 (1919). The rationale for 
the rule is fair warning. As Justice Holmes has 
commented: "Although it i~ not likely that a crim-
inal will carefully consider the text of the law 
before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a 
fair warning should be given to the world in lan-
guage that the common world will understand, of 
what the law intends to do if a certain line is pass-
ed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible 
the line should be clear." McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 
25, 27 (1931). See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, 
Criminal Law 72-74 (1972). 
CONCLUSION 
Several issues raised by the new sentencing 
statute have been examined in this article. Un-
doubtedly, there are other issues. For example, the 
firearms provision, RC 2929.71, does not specify a 
mental element (mens rea) for possession or con-
trol of a firearm. RC 2901.21 would appear to con-
trol. It provides that "[w]hen the section neither 
* * * 
specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a pur-
pose to impose strict liability, recklessness is suf-1 
ficient culpability to commit the offense." 
In addition to these issues, the new law raises a 
number of policy issues. One issue concerns the 
effect the law will have on the already overcrowd-
ed state prison system. The Columbus Correc-
tional Facility is subject to a federal court consent 
decree that requires closing that facility by 
December 31, 1983. The Ohio State Reformatory 
(Mansfield) is subject to a federal court consent 
decree, conditionally approved, that requires clos-
ing the existing cellblocks of that institution by 
i987. Although new facilities are planned for 
Cleveland, Dayton, Chillicothe, and possibily Co-
lumbus, construction has not commenced. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E. 2d 
444 (1983), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled voice-
print evidence admissible. The case is significant 
for two reasons. First, the court in Williams chang-
ed the standard for admitting novel scientific evi-
dence. Prior to Williams, the court had followed 
the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923). Under the Frye test, novel 
scientific evidence is admissible only if it has 
"gained general acceptance in the particular field 
in which it belongs." /d. at 1014. See State v. 
Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 518, 521-22, 423 N.E. 2d 137, 
140 (1981) (battered wife syndrome not generally 
accepted). The court explicitly rejected the general 
acceptance test in Williams. Instead, admissibility 
is now determined by applying the rules governing 
relevancy, Ohio Evid. R. 401-403, and expert testi-
mony, Ohio Evid. R. 702. "We believe the Rules of 
Evidence established adequate preconditions for 
admissibility of expert testimony, and we leave to 
the discretion of this state's judiciary, on a case 
by case basis, to decide whether the questioned 
testimony is relevant and will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue." 446 N.E. 2d at 448. See generally 
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific 
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Evidence: Fyre v. United States, a Half-Century 
Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980); McCormick, 
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to 
Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879 (1982) 
Second, Williams is important because it per-
mits the use of voiceprint evidence. Unfortunately, 
the court was apparently unaware of the most re-
cent report on voiceprints. See National Academy 
of Sciences, On the Theory and Practice of Voice 
Identification (1979). This report, the only indepen-
dent report on the subject, was not cited by the 
court in Williams. According to the report, the erro 
rates reported in the p"rior studies "do not consti-
tute a generally adequate basis for a judicial or 
legislative body to use in making judgements con-
cerning the reliability and acceptability of aural-
visual voice identification in forensic 
applications." /d. at 60. In other words, even when 
applying the approach to novel scientific evidence 
outlined in Williams, the admissibility of voiceprin 
evidence is highly questionable. FBI policy is to 
use voiceprints for investigative purposes only: FE 
voiceprint experts do not testify in court. See 
Koenig, Speaker lndentification (Part 2), FBI Law 
Enforcement Bull. 20, 22 (Feb. 1980). 
